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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida courts have decided an interesting variety of cases
during the past two years, and the legislature has made a number of
changes in the banking and savings and loan association laws. The legis-
lation and cases in the field of usury' and the estoppel and mortgage
acceleration cases2 are particularly interesting and important to the gen-
eral practitioner. The courts have continued to decide cases without
making any reference to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), either
* Professor of Law, University of Miami. The materials surveyed herein extend from
225 So.2d 321 through 250 So.2d 256 and the legislation enacted by the 1970 and 1971
Regular and Special Sessions of the Florida Legislature.
1. Pages 77-79 infra.
2. Pages 81-83, 84-86 infra.
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because the facts occurred prior to the effective date of the Code, or
because the lawyers failed to assert the Code. Perhaps there is a sub-
conscious feeling that if "we don't talk about it, it may go away." Not-
withstanding its limited utilization, it is doubtful that the Code will
wither away from non-use. Thus, the author has attempted to fill this




An interesting aspect of venue was raised in the case of Coon v.
Abner.' A promissory note was executed and made payable in Orange
County, Florida, and the note was secured by a mortgage on land parcels
in Dade County, Florida, and in California. The maker brought suit in
Dade County to cancel the note on the grounds of usury. A majority of
the court, in a per curiam decision, held that since the suit sounded in
equity as an action for the cancellation of an alleged usurious note,
rather than as a suit to remove a cloud or lien upon real estate, the
proper venue was in Orange County rather than in Dade.
Section 47.061 of the Florida Statutes provides that the proper
venue on a promissory note lies in the county in which the note was
signed by the maker or one of the makers. In spite of this statute, the
District Court of Appeal, First District, held in a per curiam opinion
that when a note was signed by all of the makers in Orange county,
where they all resided, venue was still proper in Bay County, because
the note grew out of a building construction and real estate transaction
consummated in Bay County. In addition, the note was a replacement note
for one originally signed in Bay County.4
B. Standing to Sue
Ordinarily, one cannot sue on a negotiable instrument unless he is
a party to it. However, if a court in a divorce action orders the maker to
pay one-half of the principal and interest to the former wife of a man
who had a half-interest in the loan evidenced by the note, the wife has
standing to sue on the instrument.5
C. Burden of Proof
Section 3-307(2) of the UCC provides that "[w]hen signatures are
admitted or established, production of the instrument entitles a holder
to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense." The Dis-
3. 246 So.2d 143 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). In light of the succinct dissenting opinion of
Judge Barkdull, the majority opinion seems questionable. Id. at 144 (dissenting opinion).
4. Gorman v. Royal Am. Constr. Co., 247 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
5. Jonat Properties, Inc. v. Gateman, 226 So.2d 703 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has used this Code section as the
basis for holding that a summary judgment should not be entered in
behalf of the plaintiff-holder of a note until he produces the note, even
though the defendant's affidavit virtually admitted that he had signed
the note.'
The burden of proof of lack of consideration for a negotiable instru-
ment rests upon the person asserting this affirmative defense, notwith-
standing anything to the contrary in Section 68.06 of the Florida Stat-
utes. Payment is also an affirmative defense. The burden of proving this
defense would be met when the maker of a promissory note offered a
satisfaction of mortgage form (which acknowledged the payment of the
note) into evidence even though the form was not a recordable instru-
ment because it only had one witness, and the expiration date of the
notary's commission was prior in time to the date of execution. A docu-
ment may be valid as showing payment even though it could not be
recorded.7
The burden of proof rules of Windle seem entirely consistent with
section 3-307 of the Code. Section 3-603 of the Code, which provides the
rules governing payment of a negotiable instrument, is silent as to any
necessity for a receipt or satisfaction form to be given in return for pay-
ment. However, section 3-505 permits the debtor who presents for pay-
ment to require "a signed receipt on the instrument for any partial or
full payment and its surrender upon full payment." It is submitted that
this latter section is consistent with the holding of Windle.
When a holder of a check claims to be a holder in due course in an
affidavit and the drawer sets forth in his affidavit the defense that the
holder had possible notice of the defense of conditional delivery, if the
drawer fails to set forth facts which would raise an inference of this
notice to the holder, summary judgment may be entered in favor of the
holder.' On the other hand, a trial court may enter a summary judgment
against the plaintiff endorsee of a note when he admits that he is not a
holder in due course and that he knew at the time he received the note
that the defendant maker was not to be held liable on the note.9
D. Consideration
The defense of failure of consideration must be properly raised as
an affirmative defense to an action on a note. When a note was given as
consideration for the purchase of a vessel which was sold "as is, where
is,"" any oral representation or warranty as to the condition of the vessel
was excluded.
6. Ferris v. Nichols, 245 So.2d 660 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
7. Windle v. Sebold, 241 So.2d 165 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Windle].
8. Kessler v. First State Bank, 247 So.2d 796 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
9. Nichols v. Stokes, 230 So.2d 44 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
10. Sokoloff v. Corinto S.S. Co., 225 So.2d 554 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure," as well as the Uniform Com-
mercial Code,'2 provide that failure of consideration must be raised (and
established) by the person asserting this defense. Furthermore, the UCC
is in accord with the holding that an "as is, where is"'1 3 sale is a dis-
claimer of any warranty of quality.
Another problem of consideration may arise when an attorney un-
dertakes to invest his client's money in return for unsecured promissory
notes issued by the borrowers. If the client later demands an accounting
of the attorney's stewardship in the matter, and the attorney gives the
client his personal promissory note when threatened with a grievance
complaint to the bar, this note is deemed supported by consideration.
The issuance of the note by the attorney in return for the express or im-
plied promise by the client that he will forbear preferring charges before
the bar association constitutes sufficient consideration. Further, the issu-
ance of the note by the attorney as agent or trustee of his client as an
accounting or settlement will also constitute consideration. 4
E. Illegality
A note given to an unlicensed real estate agent as payment for a
real estate commission is illegal and unenforceable. 5 However, a prom-
issory note given to pay a real estate agent a sum of money for arranging
for rezoning of real property is not invalid because of an illegal consid-
eration, as long as the particular efforts of the agent did not constitute
the unauthorized practice of law."6
According to the UCC, a holder who does not have rights of a holder
in due course will be subject to the defense of illegality, 7 and even a
holder in due course will take subject to this defense if the illegality is
deemed to render the instrument "a nullity.'
8
F. Depository Bank as a Holder
The case of Coconut Grove Bank v. M. R. Harrison Construction
Corp.'9 presented a seeming comedy of errors both in banking practice
and law. Harrison Corporation delivered its check to a payee who de-
posited it for collection and deposit in the Coconut Grove Bank. The
bank allowed the payee to draw checks against this uncollected check
11. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.110(d).
12. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-307 [hereinafter cited as UCCI.
13. UCC § 2-316(3).
14. Boymer v. Birmelin, 227 So.2d 358 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
15. Stockton, Whatley, Davin & Co. v. Holcomb, 232 So.2d 748 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970),
citing FLA. STAT. § 475.41 (1969).
16. Oakland Consolidated Corp. v. Southern States Land Co., 234 So.2d 384 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1970).
17. UCC § 3-306.
18. UCC § 3-305(2)(b).
19. 226 So.2d 120 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Harrison].
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and also applied most of the proceeds of the check against a promissory
note which was owed to the bank by the payee. Harrison stopped pay-
ment, and the depository bank reversed its entries crediting the major
portion of the check against the debt of the payee and recredited this
amount to the payee's account. The bank, purporting to be a holder in
due course, then sued Harrison for the amount drawn against the check
whose payment had been stopped.
There was no apparent reason for the bank to reverse its entries. If
it had not done so, it could have been a holder in due course for the
amount involved. The court said that this case was controlled by the
UCC, but that all parties had agreed that the pre-Code law was the same
as the Code law. It would appear to the author that the parties did not
understand the Code provisions applicable to this point. Section 4-208(2)
adopts the "first in, first out" system (FIFO) whereby any checks
drawn on an account are debited against the oldest deposit until it is
exhausted and then the next oldest deposit in sequence until each is ex-
hausted. A cursory glance at the Harrison decision shows that both the
trial court and appellate courts deducted the sum of $1,512.50 (which
was deposited two days after the check in question) from the amount
which the bank claimed as a holder in due course. Under a proper appli-
cation of the FIFO system, this sum was actually paid by the bank from
the check whose payment was stopped, and the bank should have recov-
ered this amount from the drawer-Harrison.
G. Payee as a Holder in Due Course
A Florida court in the case of Exchange National Bank of Winter
Haven v. Beshara,2' has finally acknowledged that in accordance with
the UCC2  a payee may be a holder in due course. In that case, a sub-
contractor entered into a security agreement with a bank under which he
assigned to the bank all past, present, and future accounts receivable
and all contract rights. The sub-contractor then notified the general con-
tractor to make all payments by check to the sub-contractor and the
bank as joint payees. An $18,000 check was issued to these joint payees,
and the bank allowed the sub-contractor to deposit the check to his own
account, rather than a special account controlled by the bank. The sub-
contractor drew on the entire $18,000 amount before the check had
cleared, and a large portion was given to the bank in payment of the
prior debt of the sub-contractor. When the general contractor stopped
payment on the check, the bank claimed to be a holder in due course in
its suit against the contractor. The court held that under sections 3-
303(1), 4-208(1), and 4-209 of the Code, the bank had a security inter-
est in the check and had given value to the extent of the withdrawals or
20. 236 So.2d 198 (FIa. 3d Dist. 1970).
21. UCC § 3-302(2).
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credit extended on the check. In addition, the bank had acted in good
faith (honesty in fact in the transaction) 22 and thus was a holder in due
course.
H. Usury
A relatively unusual facet of the usury question arose in Curtiss
National Bank of Miami Springs v. Solomon.23 Solomon owed money to
a bank. During the life of that loan the bank asked Solomon to guarantee
payment of an additional loan which the bank had made to a corporation
in which Solomon had a substantial interest. Solomon refused to give
the guarantee. Subsequently, the corporation defaulted on the loan and
the bank charged off the loan as uncollectable. When the Solomon loan
matured, the bank threatened to sell stock which it had received as col-
lateral from Solomon. Solomon asked the bank to forbear, and the bank
agreed to do so, provided that Solomon paid approximately one-half of
the defaulted corporation loan. Solomon executed various promissory
notes for the corporate debt (and his own) and eventually these notes
were paid. Solomon then sued the bank under sections 687.03 and 687.04
of the Florida Statutes. The court held as a matter of apparent first im-
pression in Florida that:
Under the broad language of the Florida Statutes (§ 687.03)
against exaction of excessive interest, directly or indirectly,
"by any contract, contrivance or device whatever," it is proper
to classify as interest an agreement to pay, in addition to a
stipulated rate of interest, the debt of another to the lender for
which the borrower is not legally obligated. While the decisions
in jurisdictions where that question has arisen are not uniform,
we approve those which so hold.24
The mere fact that a lender refuses to make a loan to individuals
and insists that they incorporate in order for him to exact additional
interest is not enough to justify a court in piercing the corporate veil and
holding that the loan was, in fact, made to the individuals and therefore
usurious. Further, under section 687.11 of the Florida Statutes, a lender
who has exacted interest in excess of fifteen percent per annum from a
corporate borrower forfeits only the interest exacted, while if the bor-
rowers were individuals the lender would forfeit double such interest.2'
The case of Fields v. Wilensky26 is another case of first impression
in Florida involving an unusual retroactive application of usury statutes.
A promissory note was given for a loan on March 16, 1964; the note was
22. ucc § 1-201(19).
23. 243 So.2d 475 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
24. Id. at 477 (emphasis added by the court).
25. Tel Service Co. v. Gen. Capital Corp., 227 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1969), affirming in part
212 So.2d 369 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968). See generally, Hadlow and Legler, Florida's General
Usury Law, 44 FLA. B.J. 570 (1970).
26. 247 So.2d 477 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Fields].
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signed by a corporation and guaranteed by an individual. The note pro-
vided for more than 25 percent interest per annum. At that time, section
687.07 of the Florida Statutes provided for forfeiture of both principal
and interest when more than 25 percent interest yearly was willfully
and knowingly charged, irrespective of the borrower's status as an indi-
vidual or a corporation. In 1965 the Legislature enacted section 687.11
which provided solely for the forfeiture of interest, and the court held
(in accordance with prior authority) that this 1965 statute impliedly
repealed section 687.07. In 1969, the legislature expressly repealed sec-
tion 687.07, but it also enacted section 687.071 which provides for for-
feiture of interest in excess of ten percent for an individual and 15 per-
cent for a corporation. Section 687.071(1) also provides that "no exten-
sion of credit made in violation of any of the provisions of this section
shall be an enforceable debt in the courts of this state."
The court held that section 687.071 impliedly repealed section
687.07 where more than 25 percent interest per annum is charged. Conse-
quently, the lender lost both principal and interest, even though the
transaction occurred years before the enactment of section 687.071. In
Fields the court further stated in dicta, that where the interest charge
exceeds ten percent for an individual debtor or 15 percent for a corporate
debtor, but is not in excess of 25 percent, the lender simply forfeits the
interest. It is interesting to note that the District Court of Appeals, First
District, has held27 that section 687.071 is not to be given a retroactive
application. Unfortunately, the court failed to cite Fields, and the law
will remain uncertain until the Supreme Court of Florida reconciles the
conflicting views.
The legislature has added a method of computation of interest to the
Florida Statutes:
For the purpose of this Section [687.03] and Section 687.02,
Florida Statutes, the rate of interest on any loan of money shall
be determined and computed upon the assumption that the debt
will be paid according to the agreed terms, and in the event said
loan is paid or collected by court action prior to the term of
said loan, any payments charged, reserved, or taken as an ad-
vance or forbearance which are in the nature of and taken into
account in the calculation of interest, shall be spread over the
stated term of the loan for the purpose of determining the rate
of interest.2
s
This amendment was obviously designed to overcome the unique Florida
rule which has made otherwise non-usurious loans usurious in the event
of acceleration. 9
27. Staros v. Avalon Shores, Inc., 249 So.2d 448 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
28. FLA. STAT. § 687.03 (Supp. 1970).
29. See e.g., First Mort. Corp. v. Stellmon, 170 So.2d 302 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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I. Bankruptcy
The filing by the makers of a promissory note of a petition under
chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Act in the federal district court does not
operate as a bar to an in personam suit by the holder of the note against
the makers nor as a valid defense to the action."° Of course, if the makers
receive a discharge in bankruptcy, this would constitute a valid defense."'
J. Splitting of a Cause of Action
In a case of apparent first impression, the District Court of Appeal,
First District, has stated that when interest is provided for by a prom-
issory note, the interest constitutes a separate promise to pay as binding
as the promise to pay the principal sum. Each promise may be made the
basis of a separate demand even after maturity. As a result, the court
denied a defense that one cannot split a cause of action and held that
the holder of a demand note may sue for and recover a judgment for
interest and then subsequently sue for and recover a judgment for
the unpaid principal over the maker's objections that the first judgment
for interest would act as a bar to the second suit.
8 2
K. Discharge
In a case involving a note executed before the effective date of the
UCC in Florida, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, considered
the matter of discharge where a note had three co-makers, one of which
was a corporation, and the other two individual co-makers who were also
the corporate president and secretary. The payee had entered into a
compromise arrangement in the bankruptcy court under which he ac-
cepted 12Y2 percent of the debt from the corporation and discharged it.
At the same time he expressly reserved his rights against "any endorser,
guarantor or surety.""3 The court held that the two individual co-makers
would be discharged under the usual contract rule that a release of one
joint contract obligor releases all of them. However, under this same
rule if the remaining contract obligors consent to the discharge of one
of the joint obligors (the corporate obligor in this case), then they will
continue to be liable to the payee of the note. Additionally, the court
stated that the clause reserving the payee's rights against "any endorser,
guarantor or surety" would not be sufficient to reserve rights against a
co-maker. It would appear that the reservation of rights clause would
also be ineffective against a co-maker under section 3-606 of the Code.
30. Bushey v. Wells, 239 So.2d 834 (Fla 4th Dist. 1970).
31. UCC § 3-305(2) (d) ; see Twinem, Determination oj Dischargeability of Debts in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 88 BANKING L.J. 591 (1971).
32. First Nat'l Bank v. Freedman, 244 So.2d 183 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
33. Glidden Co. v. Zuckerman, 245 So.2d 639, 640 (Fla, 3d Dist. 1971).
1971]
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L. Discharge of Underlying Obligation
A sizeable chunk of hard-learned contract case law has been over-
ruled by a new Florida statute which provides that "[w]hen the amount
of any debt or obligation is liquidated, the parties may satisfy the debt
by a written instrument other than by endorsement on a check for less
than the full amount due."
8 4
Under Florida case law it is a question of fact as to whether the
cashing of a check which bears the notation, "Payment of Accounts in
Full," is an accord and satisfaction of an unliquidated debt.3 5 The UCC
is of little assistance in this area.3
M. Suit on Instrument or on Underlying Obligation
According to a recent case, when a check has been issued as the
down payment for the purchase price of real property, and the drawer
stops payment on the check and refuses to complete the purchase, the
holder of the check (the vendor of the property) may sue upon the
check independently of the contract for sale which has been breached.3 7
This case is entirely consistent with section 3-802(1)(b) of the Code
which was not cited by the court.
N. Legislation
For the purpose of borrowing money for a person's own higher edu-
cation expenses, the nonage disability of minors who have reached the
age of sixteen has been removed. Any promissory notes or other instru-
ments executed to secure these loans are valid provided that the interest
rate does not exceed seven percent annually.3
III. MORTGAGES
A. Assignments
An assignee of a construction mortgage, who fails to record his as-
signment until months after the assignor-mortgagee has satisfied the
mortgage as of record, has no claim against the original mortgagors or
against a subsequent mortgagee who lent money on a permanent mort-
gage, when it appears that these latter persons had no knowledge that
anything was wrong. It should be noted, however, that this result can
occur only when the assignor-mortgagee fails to indorse the note as well
as assign the mortgage. If the note is indorsed, then only the holder can
34. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-94, amending FLA. STAT. § 725.05 (1969) (emphasis added).
35. See Best Concrete Corp. v. Oswalt Eng'r Serv. Corp., 188 So.2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1966).
36. See UCC § 3-802.
37. Popwell v. Abel, 226 So.2d 418 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
38. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-147, amending FLA. STAT. § 743.05 (1969).
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validly discharge the obligation. 9 Under section 3-603(1) of the UCC,
payment must be made to the holder for it to constitute a discharge, and
since a mortgage is merely security for a note, if the note is not dis-
charged then neither is the mortgage.
A classical law school examination question was presented by the
facts in Criado v. Milgram.4° A couple purchased a home and executed
a purchase money mortgage (to a mortgage company) with payments to
commence on September 1, 1961. On August 16, 1961, the mortgage
was assigned by the mortgage company to Milgram who allegedly wrote
the mortgagors and told them to begin paying him on September 1, 1961.
The mortgagors denied receiving this letter and continued to pay the
president of the mortgage company from September 1, 1961 through
May 1, 1963, until the president of the mortgage company vanished.
Milgram then personally advised the mortgagors of the assignment and
demanded payment of future payments. The mortgagors abided by this
demand. Milgram admitted that he knew that the mortgagors were pay-
ing the vanished president from September 1, 1961 through May 1, 1963,
but, in spite of this knowledge, instituted foreclosure proceedings for the
"unpaid" amounts which accrued within that time period.
The court held that the evidence amply supported the defense of
estoppel and that the mortgage was not in default as the mortgagors were
entitled to a credit for the full amount that they had paid to the vanished
president, as though it had been paid directly to Milgram. The UCC
provides that unless displaced by particular provisions, the principles of
law and equity, including the doctrine of estoppel, shall remain in effect
to supplement the Code. 1 Hence this case should have continued vitality.
B. Balloon Mortgages
The Florida Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the
balloon mortgage statute.42
C. Estoppel
An interesting aspect of estoppel was illustrated in Lupoff v. Har-
tog.18 A woman lent an attorney money through the intercession of her
accountant. The attorney-mortgagor prepared all of the instruments, but
he failed to indicate on the mortgage that it was a balloon mortgage in
accordance with section 697.05 (2) (a) of the Florida Statutes. When the
mortgagee instituted foreclosure proceedings, the attorney-mortgagor
attempted to assert the balloon mortgage rule which provides that unless
39. Kansas City Mort. Co. v. Crowell, 239 So.2d 130 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
40. 237 So.2d 596 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
41. UCC § 1-103.
42. Winner v. Westwood, 237 So.2d 151 (Fla. 1970), upholding FLA. STAT. § 697.05
(1969).
43. 237 So.2d 588 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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a mortgage exhibits on its face that it is a balloon mortgage, the lender
forfeits all interest and attorney's fees. The District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, held that the attorney was estopped from asserting this
defense inasmuch as he had assumed the responsibility for properly
preparing the note and mortgage when he was dealing with a widow who
had no independent legal advice.
In a mortgage foreclosure action, a husband and wife claimed the
mortgage was invalid as an encumbrance against homestead property,
and because the two subscribing witnesses who signed the mortgage were
not present when the mortgage was executed. The court held that they
were estopped to assert these defenses since they had knowledge of the
alleged defects and other provisions of the instrument from the date of
its execution. In addition, they had made monthly payments for seven
years, and the note and mortgage were at the time of the foreclosure
held by a holder in due course of the note who was the third holder of
the note and mortgage.
A classic case of estoppel was illustrated in Edelstein v. Peninsular
Lumber Supply Co.45 A husband and wife were involved in divorce pro-
ceedings, and a suit to foreclose the mortgage was brought against them.
Prior to this suit, the husband conveyed his interest in the property to
the wife as part of the divorce settlement. Service of process in the fore-
closure action was made on the husband in his own behalf, and service
was also made on the wife by leaving a copy of the summons with the
husband. The husband never informed the wife of the summons. The
mortgagee did not know of the husband's failure to inform his wife of the
summons, but she did have knowledge of the foreclosure proceedings,
and they were continued for two months in order to give her an oppor-
tunity to pay the amount owing. The wife was unable to secure the
needed funds. The property was then foreclosed and sold to a corpora-
tion controlled by her former husband. The corporation constructed a
building on the property and then defaulted on a new mortgage given by
it to the same mortgagee. The mortgagee brought foreclosure proceedings
against the corporation and the former wife. The lower court held that
the former wife was estopped from attacking these proceedings because
she stood by with knowledge of the construction of the building for a
period of approximately fifteen months without raising her claim. It
should be noted that the wife was simultaneously raising the alleged
fraud in the court which handled the original divorce proceedings.
Acceleration for failure to make a monthly payment has been denied
upon the ground of estoppel when a payment was not made within a ten
day grace period, but which was made within a former fifteen day grace
period, as originally provided for in the note and mortgage. Since the
facts showed that the mortgagees had accepted similar "late" payments
44. Harris v. Dikman, 235 So.2d 529 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
45. 247 So.2d 721 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
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in the past, and since the instant payment check and the notice of accel-
eration crossed in the mail, acceleration was not permitted.46 As previ-
ously stated in this article,47 the doctrine of estoppel has been incorpo-
rated by reference into the UCC.
D. Priorities
Under Florida Statute section 713.56 (1969) (formerly 85.07), an
after-acquired personal property provision in a real estate mortgage will
have priority over a subsequent statutory lien for labor obtained by an
electrical contractor who apparently furnished equipment, materials and
labor to the encumbered real property. In a case dealing with this point,
the court was careful to note that the equipment remained personal
property and that the contractor (for some undisclosed reason) obtained
a judgment awarding him this statutory lien rather than an equitable
or a vendor's lien.48
A mortgage which is recorded prior to the recordation of a judgment
lien against the secured property continues to have priority over the
judgment lien. This is true, even though the mortgagor gives a replace-
ment note to the mortgagee as a renewal of the debt subsequent to a
default in payment of the original note and mortgage. 9
E. Forgery
The Supreme Court of Florida has affirmed a district court of
appeal decision in Bank of Miami Beach v. Lawyers' Title Guaranty
Fund5O (which was discussed in the last Survey),1 but has chosen to
approve the decision upon a different basis. The supreme court held that
even though a mortgage note was void because it was forged, this would
not invalidate the mortgage which contained genuine signatures. Conse-
quently, since the mortgage was valid, there would not be any loss under
a mortgage guaranty title insurance policy which guaranteed that the
mortgage was a valid mortgage lien on the property. The District Court
of Appeal, Third District, had held that the loss attributable to the defect
in the note was not within the coverage of the mortgage clause of the
title policy. Both courts decided that the title insurance company was
not liable, but the legal perspectives varied.
The party asserting that signatures appearing on a deed and two
mortgage releases, allegedly executed by a person now deceased, are
46. Pearson v. Arthur, 248 So.2d 227 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
47. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
48. Acme Elec. Contr., Inc. v. Duffey, 243 So.2d 459 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
49. Silver v. Rubin, 225 So.2d 429 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
50. Bank of Miami Beach v. Fidelity Cas. Co., 239 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1970), affirming 214
So.2d 95 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). Ci. Miller v. Commercial Stand. Ins. Co., 248 So.2d 675
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
51. Murray, Negotiable Instruments and Banking, 1967-1969 Survey of Florida Law,
24 U. MiAmi L. REv. 330, 336 (1970).
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forgeries has the burden of proving it by a preponderance or greater
weight of the evidence and not by clear and convincing evidence as was
formerly required in fraud cases.52
F. Election of Remedies
The holder of a note and mortgage may sue on the note rather than
foreclose the mortgage, and this act will not discharge an indorser on the
note. After receiving a judgment on the note, the holder may then fore-
close the mortgage if the original judgment remains unsatisfied. Al-
though it was not mentioned by the court, in a recent case involving this
point,' the reader is cautioned that it may be unwise to sue on the note
rather than to foreclose the mortgage when an indorser of the note is
involved, because the indorser may assert that this act unjustifiably im-
paired his rights against the collateral under section 3-606(1) (b) of the
Code. Of course, a proper utilization of section 3-606(2) (express reser-
vation of rights) would eliminate all problems.
In one case, the mortgagors (a husband and wife) testified that
they recorded mortgage payments in a ledger book about a week or ten
days after the date of payments (some type of work by the mortgagors
was apparently to be treated as payments on the mortgage). The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that it was erroneous to
admit this ledger under either the Shop Book Act (section 92.37 of the
Florida Statutes) or the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act
(section 92.36 of the Florida Statutes), because the entries in the book
were not made contemporaneously with the transactions, nor were they
made in the regular course of business. 4
When a mortgagor asserts a valid defense to the payment of a mort-
gage, it is error for the trial court to enter a pendente lite order relieving
the mortgagor of his duty to make the payments. Instead, the court
should order that all payments be deposited with the court.55
G. Acceleration
A series of three cases 6 discloses a conflict between the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, which refuses to use any kind of an
unconscionability brake to acceleration of mortgages by lenders, and the
District Court of Appeal, Second District, which apparently conditions
the right to accelerate upon some showing of substantial harm to the
52. Pate v. Mellen, 237 So.2d 266 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). See Rigot v. Bucci, 245 So.2d
51 (Fla. 1971) as to the change in the Florida rule regarding the standard of proof required
in proving allegations of fraud.
53. Lisbon Holding & Inv. Co. v. Village Apt., Inc., 237 So.2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
54. E.Z.E., Inc. v. Jackson, 235 So.2d 337 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
55. Itvenus, Inc. v. Poultry, Inc., 241 So.2d 452 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
56. Campbell v. Werner, 232 So.2d 252 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) ; Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237
So.2d 583 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970); Schechtman v. Grobbel, 226 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
lender by actions of the debtor. The UCC uses a good faith test in the
limited area of acceleration of instruments which permit acceleration
"at will,"" while another more generalized section of the Code provides
that "every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement."58 The law of mortgages
is a hybrid of real property law and the law of negotiable instruments
and, as a consequence, the field is not entirely controlled by the Code.
It is submitted, however, that the concepts of good faith and unconscion-
ability should not be entirely foreign to the question of acceleration.
When a mortgagee has elected to accelerate (by filing a foreclosure
action) the payment of the mortgage after a default in an installment
payment by the mortgagor, it is reversible error for the trial court to
deny acceleration and foreclosure on the grounds that the mortgagor had
expended large sums of money in improving the property prior to the
default and that he was willing to pay up the amount of the defaulted
installment.5 9 On the other hand, it has been held that when a mortgage
provides that the mortgagee has the right to accept or reject the mort-
gagor's grantee, the mortgagor conveys the property without the consent
of the mortgagee, and the mortgage provides that the mortgagee may
accelerate for any breach of the mortgage by the mortgagor, a court of
equity will not allow the mortgagee to accelerate in the absence of a
showing that harm has resulted to the mortgagee as a result of this
",breach."60
In Schechtman v. Grobbel,61 a "rider" to a mortgage provided that
[i]n order to provide an escrow for the payment of County
and City taxes, mortgagors shall pay together with and in
addition to the regular monthly payment a sum equal to one-
twelfth (1/12th) of the current annual taxes .... 62
The mortgagors for a period of time paid the principal, interest, and
one-twelfth of the taxes monthly to the mortgagee. Subsequently, the
mortgagors paid the tax payment into an escrow bank account and re-
fused to pay the amounts monthly to the mortgagees. The mortgagees
brought suit to foreclose, and the trial court refused foreclosure on the
grounds that the quoted clause created an ambiguity and that the secur-
ity was never in jeopardy. The District Court of Appeal, Second District,
held that the clause was not ambiguous and that the trial court erred in
ordering the tax payments paid into the registry of the court. However,
the appellate court affirmed the denial of foreclosure, even though there
57. UCC § 1-208.
58. UCC § 1-203.
59. Campbell v. Werner, 232 So.2d 252 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). The court reviewed the
cases which have held that only in the most extreme situations will a court be justified in
denying acceleration of the mortgage upon default by the mortgagor.
60. Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So.2d 583 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
61. 226 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
62. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
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was a technical breach, because the security was never in jeopardy. The
appellate court also held that the trial court was incorrect in refusing to
award attorney's fees. This was because the mortgage provided for the
fees in the event that an attorney was employed by the mortgagees due
to a failure of the mortgagors to abide by all of the covenants of the
mortgage. The attorney's fees should not be measured by the same stan-
dard as if there had been a foreclosure, but a reasonable fee should be
awarded as a result of the mortgagor's default.
An interesting tactical delaying defense to acceleration and fore-
closure was presented in Adams v. Citizens Bank of Brevard.63 A bank
filed suit to foreclose a mortgage upon the ground that the mortgagors
failed to make interest and tax payments and breached certain provisions
of a construction loan agreement for which the mortgage was given. The
mortgagors counterclaimed alleging that the bank had breached its con-
struction loan agreement which caused the mortgagor to default, and
the counter-claimant demanded a jury trial of this issue. The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the counterclaimant was en-
titled to a jury trial on this issue, and the trial court was in error in
entering a judgment of foreclosure.
A mortgage which provides that it may be accelerated at the option
of the mortgagee in the event that the mortgagor should convey the
mortgaged property without the mortgagee's written consent and with-
out the assumption of the mortgage by the grantee may not be accelerated
when the land is sold without such written consent if the grantee does
assume and agree to pay the mortgage.
H. Deficiency Actions
A mortgagee, who forecloses his mortgage and subsequently receives
a deficiency judgment against the mortgagors which remains unsatisfied,
may assert this deficiency against an insurance carrier which is ad-
mittedly liable for a fire loss which occurred prior to the foreclosure
action.6" It has also been held that a trial court should not enter a defi-
ciency judgment in favor of a first mortgagee during the pendency of a
suit filed by the second mortgagee to redeem the property. Only after
the conclusion of the suit to redeem will a court be in a position to deter-
mine the amount, if any, of the deficiency.66
A relatively unusual mortgage problem was presented in Symon v.
Charleston Capital Corp.617 A mortgagee held one mortgage on land in
North Carolina and another on land in Florida, the latter mortgage being
given as additional security for the original loan secured by the North
63. 248 So.2d 682 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
64. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. English, 249 So.2d 707 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
65. Lutheran Bhd. v. Hooten, 237 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
66. 601 West 26 Corp. v. Equity Capital Co., 235 So.2d 771 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
67. 242 So.2d 765 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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Carolina property. The loan went into default, and the mortgagee fore-
closed on the North Carolina property. This was done in accordance with
North Carolina law which permits direct sale of land by a trustee under
a deed of trust without the necessity of judicial foreclosure. The mort-
gagee bid in the North Carolina property and then brought suit to fore-
close the Florida mortgage. The mortgagor asserted the events in North
Carolina as a defense. The Florida court held that:
[W]here a mortgagee holds two mortgages on different parcels
of land to secure the same debt which is in default, and seeks
to foreclose such mortgages successively, it is not necessary to
obtain a deficiency judgment in the one which is foreclosed
first as a prerequisite to foreclosing the other. However, the
defendant in the second foreclosure suit is entitled to the same
equitable considerations as a defense, either in full or pro tanto,
as would have been available to the mortgagor in the first suit
had the mortgagee bid in the property and thereafter sought a
deficiency judgment.6
Under this reasoning, the District Court of Appeals, Fourth District,
approved the actions of the trial court in finding that the true value of
the North Carolina property was to be offset against the amount owed
in the second foreclosure ($46,175, rather than the bid price of $25,000).
An interesting deficiency judgment question was presented in
Peterson v. Sutton.69 Foreclosure of mortgage proceedings took place in
Georgia. The mortgagees who held the purchase-money mortgage bid in
the property for $40,000 which left $5,000 unpaid on the mortgage. The
Georgia court confirmed the sale and the mortgagees brought suit in
Florida for the remaining $5,000. The trial and appellate courts
agreed that inasmuch as the testimony showed that the property was in
fact worth $45,000 and that the mortgagees now held the property,
Florida could refuse to award a deficiency judgment in spite of the fact
that the Georgia court confirmed the sale.
I. Redemption
When a foreclosure judgment does not state a definite period within
which the mortgagor may redeem the property, he may do so at any time
prior to the issuance of the master's deed at a foreclosure sale, unless the
court should order otherwise. Further, the equity of redemption may be
exercised at any time before the judge approves the sale by entering an
order confirming the master's report of the foreclosure sale.
70
A second mortgagee will be precluded upon the basis of unclean
hands from redeeming mortgaged property after it has been foreclosed
68. Id. at 768.
69. 230 So.2d 493 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
70. Rosen v. Hunter, 227 So.2d 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), modifying 224 So.2d 371 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1969).
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by the first mortgagee and sold at a judicial sale when the second mort-
gagee took part in the foreclosure sale. In a recent case which so held,
the second mortgagee did not bring an action until nine years after his
cause of action accrued and after the purchaser had substantially im-
proved the property. The amount owing (principal and interest) to him
had been deposited into the registry of the court, and it was admitted that
the second mortgagee was trying to obtain title to property worth more
than $1,000,000 for approximately $20,000." 1
J. Legislation
Original section 697.04(1) of the Florida Statutes provided that
any mortgage or other instrument creating a lien on real or personal
property which provided for future advances was required to provide
for the maximum amount of the future advances and for a period not
to exceed 20 years. This section was in conflict with a UCC provision,
section 679.9-204(5) of the Florida Statutes. As a result, section 697.04
has been amended to delete any reference to personal property.
72
A guardian of property may now execute a deed, lease, or mortgage
in the name of the ward. The guardian may then convey, lease, mortgage,
or release any actual or apparent interest of the ward in any property
including homestead property.78
IV. ACCOMMODATION PARTIES
A guarantor of payment of a negotiable promissory note becomes
liable upon default by the makers of the note, and there is no duty
incumbent upon the holders to first sue the makers before filing suit
against the guarantor. Further, the guarantor is not relieved of liability
by the failure of the holder to notify the guarantor of default, nor by
the fact that the holder has extended the time of payment or has ac-
cepted partial rather than full payments of installments. Finally, if there
is consideration between the maker and payee of the note, it also consti-
tutes consideration supporting the promise of the guarantor.74 Section
3-416 of the UCC codifies the various holdings of this case.
An accommodation party on a negotiable instrument may sign as
a maker for the accommodation of an indorser and may recover from the
indorser any amounts which have been paid to the holder of the instru-
ment.75 Section 3-415 of the UCC is in accord.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has held that where
a husband and wife gave a letter to a bank which stated that in consider-
71. Sponder v. Equity Capital Co., 248 So.2d 251 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
72. FLA. STAT. § 697.04 (Supp. 1970).
73. FLA. STAT. § 745.15 (Supp. 1970), repealing FLA. STAT. § 745.15(6) (1969).
74. Anderson v. Trade Winds Ent. Corp., 241 So.2d 174 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) (pre-
Code transaction).
75. London Distrib. Co. v. Bastone, 244 So.2d 550 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
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ation for the bank making loans to a corporation from time to time, the
couple "jointly and severally [would] guarantee repayment of all such
loans now outstanding or hereafter created . . . ,"" the couple were
liable as guarantors for loans actually made by the bank to the corpora-
tion under the law of guarantyship and not under sections 3-119(1),
3-416(1), 3-118(6), 3-401, 3-606(1) or 3-102(1) of the UCC. The
court was careful to point out that if the guaranty had been written on
the notes which were given by the corporation to the bank, then the
guaranty would be governed by the Code. However, when the guaranty
is in fact a guaranty of the loans as distinguished from the notes, then
the Code has no application.
V. BANKS AND SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
A. General and Special Deposits
When a bank escrow agreement provides that checks are to be paid
upon the co-signature of two persons and the bank honors checks bearing
the sole signature of one cosigner who applies the funds to his own use,
the bank is liable to the corporation which furnished the funds.
A bank does not have the right to deduct from a married woman's
account the face amount of a check which had been endorsed by her
husband after it was drawn by another person.7"
In an action for the "conversion" of a federal savings and loan asso-
ciation account, brought by the depositor against "converters," the three
year statute of limitations under Florida Statute section 95.11 (5) (c)
commences to run from the date that the depositor knows, or in the exer-
cise of ordinary business care would have discovered the fact of conver-
sion, rather than from the date of the wrongful "conversion. 72
The case of Champion Map Corp. v. Chamco, Inc."° is one of first
impression in Florida under the UCC. Champion employed Chamco to
solicit orders for its maps which Champion would send directly to the
customers. The customers would then pay Chamco which was supposed
to deposit the money in Champion's account in a Florida bank. Unfortu-
nately, Chamco deposited the collections in its own account. Subse-
quently, the arrangement was modified to provide that the retail buyers
of the maps would pay Champion directly, but again some of the cus-
tomers' money found its way into Chamco's bank account. The bank
filed a financing statement against Chamco's bank account, and Champion
knew of this filing. When Champion subsequently claimed the money in
Chamco's account, the bank claimed priority as being the first to file a
financing statement. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, re-
76. Fewox v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 249 So.2d 55 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
77. First Nat'l Bank v. Maricopa Corp., 230 So.2d 191 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
78. Graham v. First Marion Bank, 237 So.2d 793 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
79. Hart v. Hart, 234 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
80. 235 So.2d 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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versed a summary judgment for the bank and held that the arrange-
ment between Champion and its agent Chamco may have constituted an
assignment of contract rights to Champion under which Champion was
also to perform. If this is true, then section 9-104(6) of the UCC would
control, and such an assignment is specifically excluded from the pro-
visions of UCC Article 9 with the result that Champion might have
priority over the bank. Testimony would have to be taken to ascertain
which of the claimants to the account should prevail.
B. Payment and Collection of Items
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held in a pre-
code transaction that a collecting bank and a drawee bank are liable in
conversion to a co-payee of a check when both banks honor a check
which does not bear the indorsement of the co-payee, since the law
requires the indorsements of all joint payees. However, the co-payee's
recovery is limited to his provable interest in the proceeds rather than the
full amount of the check."' Section 3-116(b) of the UCC provides that
a check made payable to two or more persons is "payable to all of them
and may be negotiated, discharged or enforced only by all of them."
Under section 3-419 of the Code, the collecting bank is not liable in con-
version "beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands."
This rule will usually result in the non-liability of collecting banks, since
the proceeds will not be in their possession, but in the possession of the
wrongdoers.
In a very cryptic opinion, the District Court of Appeals, Third
District, has held that in accordance with section 3-409(1) of the UCC
a drawee bank is not liable on a check until it accepts (certifies) it.82
Section 4-104(1)(g) of the UCC (Section 674.104(l)(g) of the
Florida Statutes) which deals with the definition of the word "item" was
amended by adding the additional wording:
and a photographic or other similar reproduction of an item
may be treated in all respects as the original item by any payor
bank or non-bank payor of the item, upon being furnished
with an affidavit that the original item has been lost or destroyed
and being furnished with security satisfactory to such payor.8"
C. Cashiers' Checks
It is legally improper for a bank to refuse to pay a cashier's check
which it issued and which is in the hands of a holder in due course.84
81. Wilton Manors Nat'l Bank v. Adobe Brick & Supply Co., 232 So.2d 29 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1970).
82. Eastern Air Lines v. Coral Gables First Nat'l Bank, 240 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
83. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-44.
84. Sani-Serv. Div. of Burger Chef Systems, Inc. v. Southern Bank, 244 So.2d 509 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1970). This case also reached the same result on another theory dealing with
adequacy of consideration.
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D. Gifts of Savings Accounts
A valid inter vivos gift requires three things: donative intent, de-
livery and acceptance by the donee. The recent case of Wood v. Mc-
Clellan" involves an unusual combination of these requisites. A father
had a savings account in a federal savings and loan association. His
daughter secured forms from the association to change the account to
a new one in the joint names of the father and daughter. An employee
of the association told the daughter that a change in the account to a
joint status prior to December 29th would result in a loss of interest. The
father and daughter signed the forms, but the daughter was in agreement
with the association that the account should not be changed until after
December 31st. This action was, according to the court, either in accor-
dance with the father's instructions or with his consent. On December
23rd, the father died, and the association, not being aware of the father's
death, made the change in the account on December 29th. The association
sent the interest check to the decedent. The court held that there was
insufficient proof of a valid gift inter vivos because there was no donative
intent until after the due date of the interest (December 29), and there
had been no acceptance until this date. Both of these factors occurred six
days after the death of the alleged donor, hence his death prevented
the completion of the gift. The holding of the Wood case should be com-
pared with a subsequently adopted statute"6 which provides that whenever
an account (including a certificate of deposit) is opened in a bank in the
names of two or more persons whether minors or an adult, payable to
either of the survivors, it shall be presumed that the depositors intended
that upon the death of any of them that the account (and additions
thereto) should vest in the survivor or survivors. This presumption "may
be overcome only by proof of fraud, undue influence, or clear and con-
vincing proof of a contrary intent." In the absence of such proof, all
rights to the account shall vest in the survivor
notwithstanding the absence of proof of any donative intent or
delivery, possession, dominion, control or acceptance on the part
of any person, and notwithstanding the provisions hereof may
constitute or cause a vesting or disposition of property or rights
or interests therein, testamentary in nature which except for the
provisions of this section, would or might otherwise be void or
voidable.8
7
It should be noted that this statute applies only to banks. Hence the
validity of the Wood case (which involved a savings and loan associa-
tion) would not be affected.
85. 247 So.2d 77 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
86. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-205, adding FLA. STAT. § 659.291.
87. Id.
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E. Gifts to Minors Act
Section 710.08 of the Florida Statutes (the Gifts to Minors Act)
was substantially reworded with respect to the resignation, death, or re-
moval of custodians, the appointment of successor custodians, per-
formance bonds, and the like. It is interesting to note that a minor who
is fourteen and who does not have a guardian has the power under this
amended section to designate a successor custodian.88
F. Garnishment
Sections 77.24 and 77.07 of the Florida Statutes provide means by
which a writ of garnishment (of a bank account) may be discharged or
dissolved. A discharge or dissolution under these sections is sufficient for
the person whose bank account has been unlawfully garnished to bring
a suit for wrongful garnishment against the garnishor .
9
The Supreme Court of Florida, in reversing the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, has held that a husband and wife may hold a
checking account as an estate by the entirety so as to preclude a creditor
of the husband from garnishing the account.
So long as a bank account contract or signature card is
drafted in a manner consistent with the essential unities of the
entireties estate, and so long as it contains a statement of per-
mission for one spouse to act for the other, the requirement of
form of the estate will have been met. However, since the form
will be similar to that of a joint tenancy, and since the spouses
may or may not intend that a tenancy by the entireties should
result, the intention of the parties must be proven unless the
instrument creating the tenancy clearly bears an express designa-
tion that the tenancy is one held by the entiretiesY0
The garnishment statutes were amended to provide that a gar-
nishee-bank which has deposits in its possession in the names of a
defendant named in the writ and in a name of another (or others) should
state this fact in its answer by giving the names and addresses of these
other depositors. The plaintiff should then, within five days of receiving
this answer from the garnishee-bank, serve upon these persons notice
of the writ of garnishment and the answer of the garnishee-bank.
Further, service of a writ of garnishment shall now render the gar-
nishee "liable as provided ...in any fiduciary or representative ca-
pacity held by him if the fiduciary or representative capacity is speci-
fied in the writ." 91
88. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-23.
89. Dynatronics, Inc. v. Knorr, 247 So.2d 71 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
90. First Nat'l Bank of Leesburg v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So.2d 777, 781 (Fla. 1971),
reversing 236 So.2d 240 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
91. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-69.
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G. Legislation Affecting Banks, Trust Companies and Industrial
Savings Banks
Section 656.21 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide that
the Commissioner of Banking may furnish a copy of all examinations
of industrial savings banks to the Federal Reserve Board and require
that these banks submit annual reports of their income and dividends.92
A similar addition was made to section 658.07 of the Florida Statutes,
which deals with banks and trust companies.93 In addition, the minimum
par value per share of capital stock which may be issued by an indus-
trial savings bank has been reduced from $10 to $5,4 and a similar rule
has been provided for banks and trust companies. 5
Industrial savings banks may now take second mortgages "if the
principal amount secured by the first and second mortgages, in the ag-
gregate, does not exceed seventy percent of the appraised value of the
encumbered real estate"9" and may charge a discount not to exceed 8
percent per annum "upon the total amount of the loan from the date
thereof until the maturity of the final installment, notwithstanding that
the principal amount of such loan is required to be repaid in install-
ments."97 These banks may also levy a five percent late payment charge
on any late principal or installment payment. 8 In other legislation affect-
ing industrial savings banks, sections 656.031(2) and 656.22 of the
Florida Statutes were amended to provide for a fee to accompany appli-
cations for the organization of industrial savings banks and fees for
the semiannual examinations and assessments on total assets.99 Similar
amendments were made to section 659.02(2) of the Florida Statutes
which deals with state banks and trust companies. 00
The legislature also enacted several laws relating to banking opera-
tions. Section 659.06(2) of the Florida Statutes dealing with the opera-
tion and location of bank facilities was slightly amended to remove
references to drive-in and walk-up banking facilities.' Banks and trust
companies may now close during periods of emergency (storms, floods,
strikes, riots, civil commotions, etc.) when declared by the Commis-
sioner of Banking or by an authorized officer of the bank. The closing
of banks during this emergency period is to be treated as a legal holiday
insofar as the making of protest, clearance of banking items and other
time requirements are concerned.0 2 Under an amendment to section
92. FLA. STAT. § 656.21 (Supp. 1970).
93. FLA. STAT. § 658.07 (Supp. 1970).
94. FLA. STAT. § 656.091 (Supp. 1970), amending FLA. STAT. § 656.091(1) (1969).
95. FLA. STAT. § 659.08 (Supp. 1970).
96. FLA. STAT. § 656.18(5) (Supp. 1970), amending FLA. STAT. § 646.1(5) (1969).
97. FLA. STAT. § 656.17(1) (Supp. 1970), amending FLA. STAT. § 656.17(i) (1969).
98. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-200, amending FLA. STAT. § 656.17(5) (1969).
99. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-262 [FLA. STAT. §§ 656.031(2), 656.22 (Supp. 1970)].
100. FLA. STAT. § 659.02(2) (Supp. 1970).
101. FLA. STAT. § 659.06(2) (Supp. 1970).
102. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-160.
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658.10(1) of the Florida Statutes all reports made by banks and trust
companies to the Department of Banking and Finance are confidential
communications and shall not be made public without the consent of
the Commissioner of Banking, or pursuant to a court order." 3 A similar
amendment was made to section 656.211 of the Florida Statutes with
regard to reports of industrial savings banks.' °4
Changes affecting the scope of permissable investments available
to banks and the utilization of a bank's investment portfolio were also
made. Section 656.241°5 and 659.2006 dealing with permitted invest-
ments of industrial savings banks, banks, and trust companies were ex-
tensively reworded as to permitted stock investments, investments in
savings and loan shares, community help projects, and other investments.
Also, banks and trust companies may now invest up to five percent of
their unimpaired capital and surplus in small business investment com-
panies which are organized under the provisions of the United States
Code.0 7 In addition, section 659.16(1) of the Florida Statutes was
amended to provide that
[t]he par value of eligible securities which are owned by the
bank free of pledge or encumbrance, and that portion of the
par value of eligible securities which is in excess of the deposit
to which pledged may be utilized in meeting reserve require-
ments."0 s
Other legislation was enacted which expands the investment out-
lets of foreign banks and sets down stock ownership requirements for the
directors of all banks. Foreign banks are now authorized to enter into
mortgage servicing contracts with persons authorized to transact busi-
ness in Florida.10 A director of a bank and trust company must now own
voting common stock of the bank of which he is a director in an amount
of at least $1,000 par value free of any lien or pledge agreement."0 A
similar amendment was made to section 656.121 of the Florida Statutes
with regard to directors of industrial savings banks."'
It is not required by the Florida Banking Code" 2 or the Administra-
tive Procedure Act"' for the Florida Commissioner of Banking to con-
duct an open hearing in approving an application for individuals to
organize a corporation to transact a general banking business in a com-
103. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-170.
104. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-200.
105. FLA. STAT. § 656.24 (Supp. 1970).
106. FLA. STAT. § 659.20 (Supp. 1970).
107. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-167, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.20(5) (c) (1969).
108. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-169.
109. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-336, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.57(1) (1969).
110. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-168, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.11(2) (1969).
111. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-171.
112. FLA. STAT. §§ 659.01-659.66 (1969).
113. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.011-120.331 (1969).
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munity, nor is an open hearing required under the due process clauses of
the federal and state constitutions." 4
H. Legislation Affecting Building and Loan Associations
Section 665.091 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide that
only 25 members of a building and loan association need be present
personally or by eligible proxy at an annual or any special meeting in
order to have a proper quorum.""
Subject to annual percentage limitations, building and loan associa-
tions may now sell loans "with recourse.""' However, building and loan
associations must now invest at least sixty percent of their assets, other
than liquid assets, in direct reduction loans on home property or in
direct reduction loans on primarily residential property, or both."'
Section 665.361 of the Florida Statutes which relates to investments
of building and loan associations was substantially reworded to provide
that a building and loan association may invest all of its assets in direct
obligations of the United States or of obligations fully guaranteed as to
principal and interest by the United States. However, if the obligations
are issued by a federal agency and are not fully guaranteed, then no more
than 25 percent of the association's assets may consist of these secur-
ities." 8
The "Savings Association Act" was amended by adding sections
665.55 through 665.65 to allow building and loan associations, and savings
and loan associations to operate and lease safety deposit facilities. The
amendment provides, in detail, for the rights of box holders, their suc-
cessors, and adverse claimants." 9
114. Bay Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dickinson, 229 So.2d 302 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
115. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-91.
116. Fla. Laws 197, ch. 71-92, amending FLA. STAT. § 665.214(5) (1969).
117. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-93, amending FLA. STAT. § 665.381(2)(d) (1969).
118. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-90.
119. FLA. STAT. §§ 665.55-.65 (Supp. 1970).
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